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Abstract. This paper merges the literature on regulation, specifically private 
provision of public goods, and governance with the literature on philanthropic 
institutions (awqaf) in Turkey. Traditionally, awqaf (plural for the waqf) have been 
very functional regarding the socioeconomic realms in Muslim societies. On the 
other hand, the provision of public goods is one of the core discussions under the 
literature on regulation and governance, particularly the property rights. This paper 
analyzes the role of waqf which has historically been more than a charitable 
organization: an economic agent in Turkey. Being a long-time provider of public 
goods, awqaf can be studied of property rights and regulation process, while its 
organizational structure could be considered as a subject to the firm theory. Turkish 
philanthropic institutions possess historical significance in terms of their 
organizational evolution and relationship to the changing governance structures in 
the country. Therefore, also discussed in this paper are the similarities and 
differences between the awqaf and Western charitable organizations, particularly in 
terms of organizational structures, definition of property rights, and their evolution 
under different governance-related structures such as rule of law and contract 
enforcement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For centuries, philanthropic institutions have played an important role both 
in Western and Islamic traditions. A specific organization called Al-Waqf has 
achieved a significant socioeconomic position in the Islamic world that is 
comparable to its counterpart in Western societies. Functioning beyond 
private philanthropic institutions, awqaf (waqfs) possess a wide range of 
contributions to social welfare. 
       Al-waqf literally means to stand, to allocate, and to immobilize (to make 
dependent and conditional). Both in Arabic literature and religious law, it 
refers to a special type of donation in which the donor is not the beneficiary 
of the revenues, and profits stem from the assets donated. In the pre-modern 
history of the Islamic societies, usual types of the waqfs are the family 
waqfs. They aim to make ongoing revenue sources for the descendants and 
their lineage. Such an endowment is characterized as being mu’aqqab (for a 
descent group). Since waqfs are based on interpretation of the Prophet’s 
hadith (words and deeds), this judicial attempt is also driven by the social 
and economic complexity of Islamic society along with the religious 
motivation behind them.  
With the expansion of Islam throughout western Arabia, Northern Africa 
and the East (Iran, Afghanistan and India), Islamic societies became even 
more developed and sophisticated. In the early Islamic period under the rule 
of Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties for instance, Muslims tried to answer the 
needs of this complex social structure. Therefore, early examples of awqaf 
(with its judicial grounds) are observed in the first and second century of 
Islam. The finance of the jihad (struggling for God’s sake) is considered as 
an important motive during the early periods of the Islamic state [quoted in 
Gil (1998)]. Therefore, chief function of the waqf was to finance the Muslim 
fighters for the Faith and for the early Muslim brotherhood. It was a 
benefaction for God’s sake without seeking any worldly reward. Later 
periods of whatever the motives are, the waqf institution has played an 
important role in Islamic societies as it was both common and economically 
significant. In the example of Ottoman State’s classical age for instance, it is 
quite impressive to witness how comprehensive and common are waqfs and 
their properties in the Turkish society. These properties once constituted one 
third of the cultivatable lands in the Ottoman State, including the Middle 
East and the Balkans.  
Some scholars view founding a waqf as circumventing Islamic law, as 
there is no direct evidence from the Qur’an, only interpretations of Prophet’s 
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hadith. Since all the property owned by individuals was subject to taxation, 
people could be said to have some “property rights” acquiring motives in 
order to protect their heirs, and in some cases themselves. It should, 
however, be noted that most of the waqfs founded through Islamic history 
are charitable foundations rather than family endowments. Therefore, 
Muslims’ main motivation for founding an endowment is more than simply 
circumventing the Islamic law. Simply put, waqf prevailed as a private 
provider of public goods and services until the modern type municipalities 
were founded in 19th century Islamic world, specifically in the Ottoman 
State.  
Provision of public goods and the definition of property rights have been 
a challenge for every society regardless of their development level (Kuran, 
2001). Public goods are defined as goods that are non-excludible (not 
requiring special authorization to consume) and non-rival (to be consumed 
by many of the demanders at the same time). Waqfs, acting as intermediaries 
between localities and the central government which produced public goods, 
should also be analyzed with regard to the Islamic countries’ economic 
development and their adaptation of global governance bodies. A private 
institution (i.e. waqf) can supply any good or service that is defined to be 
public in an efficient way, even if it creates an incentive for monopolistic 
behavior in some cases. Due to the issues regarding economies of scale in 
provision of such goods, government intervention might even lead to losses 
in social welfare. However, it is argued that under the private provision of 
the public goods there may still be some need for government regulation of 
market functioning and maintaining competition (Kahn, 1988).  
For the aim of this paper, historical significance or the “history of waqf 
system” is not the main question. We will only provide a discussion of the 
waqf system in regard to modern regulative and governance structures and 
try to answer whether this institutional basis is an obstacle on the 
development of advanced social and economic bodies. Regulations on the 
provision of public goods constitute the first dimension of the relationship 
between the waqf institutional base and modern governance structures. This 
can be described as the positive analysis of the waqf system in terms of 
regulatory issues, such as principle-agent problem, monitoring, and adverse 
selection. The second discussion with that regard focuses on the normative 
arguments (such as Kuran’s arguments) around the waqf system. The 
normative arguments against the history and role of the waqfs define such 
institutions as a result of inadequate governance structures and the lack of 
secular law practices in the Islamic world. Accordingly, waqf system 
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emerged in those societies which lacked well-defined property rights or a 
functioning democracy and rule of law. Additionally, this is said to have 
granted an excessive role of government bureaucracy and thus led to high 
levels of corruption (Kuran, 2007 and 2011). Our argument in the last 
section of this paper however contends that the long-prevalence of waqf 
system in the Islamic societies could not justify such normative arguments as 
put forward by Kuran and others. Historically, those institutions played a 
complementary role to the government’s provision of public goods, with 
both rises and falls throughout the mediaeval and early modern ages of the 
Islamic world (especially Turkey). Their counterparts (i.e. western charitable 
organizations) have also prevailed for centuries in other societies that 
demonstrate well-defined governance structures. For instance, recent figures 
on the waqfs established in Turkey after 1980s clearly indicate the rise of 
waqfs is not associated with the decline of governance bodies in a society. 
Rather, they play a complementary role to the government policies regarding 
their social dimensions. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: The first section provides a brief 
definition and a perspective on the historical development of waqf institution 
along with its organizational structure and different types. The second 
section focuses on the economic and social role of waqf in the Ottoman and 
modern Turkish society. This section draws special attention to the issues 
that arise from agency problems while elaborating on the reasons that led to 
inefficiency and corruption. Third section of the paper elaborates on the 
reasons for the decline of waqf system and brings light to the centralized 
waqf system and the effects of government regulation in Turkey, while 
adapting an institutional perspective on the possible correlation between the 
evolution of governance bodies and recent developments regarding the 
waqfs in Turkey. Last but not the least, in the concluding section; this study 
argues that waqfs are complementary bodies to modern governance 
structures rather than being alternatives or obstacles to them. 
 
2. Foundations and the History of Philanthropic Institutions in Islamic 
Society 
 
Waqf as a philanthropic institution finds its roots mostly in Islamic heritage. 
Beginning with the early stages of Islamic social and intellectual life, the 
perception and belief in the “day of judgment” made Muslims forming 
institutions or performing pious deeds. The thought of being rewarded in the 
life hereafter has led them to seek everlasting good deeds, which were 
believed to please God. Religious factors draw the limits of such an 
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organization, as they are the basic motive in founding a waqf. It is a 
voluntary, permanent, and irrevocable dedication of a portion of one’s 
wealth to God, while the corpus of the waqf should remain intact because it 
belongs to God (Ariffhidayat, 2010). 
 
2.1. Conceptual and Organizational Aspects 
 
The definition of waqf is not uniform across Islamic society, although there 
are basic forms that do not vary within different types of waqfs. A waqf is 
usually defined as an unincorporated institution established under Islamic 
law by a living man or woman for the provision of a designated social 
service in perpetuity. Emphasizing religious factors beneath, the waqf can be 
defined as an action of a Muslim individual, motivated by an element of 
Islamic culture, to transform some or all of his personal assets into pious 
foundations to serve the public.  
Waqfs can be categorized based on their waqfiyyas (endowment 
deeds): 
1. Charitable waqfs are founded for the provision of social and 
economic services. The beneficiaries of this type of waqfs are 
usually the poor, the elderly, or people living around the holy 
mosques of Mecca, Medina, or Jerusalem. These waqfs play a 
significant role in sharing the central government’s fiscal needs and 
the responsibility for provision of public goods. 
2. Family waqfs are typically the ones which the founder states the 
beneficiaries to be his/her descendants and continuing lineage. These 
are mostly founded to ensure the property maintains perpetual 
revenue for the founder’s family after his/her death. A family waqf 
prevents the government, for instance, from confiscating the 
property appropriated as waqf. 
A family endowment (waqf) can be established between two living 
beings inter vivos (Powers, 1999) or by last will and testament. This type of 
endowment is not limited by size. An inter vivo endowment immediately 
takes effect and cannot be revoked by the founder. A testamentary 
endowment takes effect after the founder’s death and is limited by one-third 
of the person’s net assets. This is a legal constraint on many Muslims. 
Another implication of this type of endowment should not be in favor of a 
legal heir of the founder. Property of an endowment were becoming 
perpetuity, by designating a religious institution such as a mosque, school or 
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the personnel associated with the institution as the ultimate beneficiary. The 
endowment deed and other important records relating to the waqf are 
important to avoid future disputes, or at least make the judiciary power to 
solve the issues.  
Although there are some views that contend the origin of waqf (see 
Kazıcı, 2003) was from the Roman, pre-Islamic Arabia or Byzantium era, 
there is no sound evidence to support this. Additionally, the level of 
interactions between the civilizations is subject to another study, and these 
discussions will be discarded for the aim of this analysis (assuming the waqf 
institution was born with the introduction of Islam). In the formation of 
waqf, there were two legal principles that Muslim jurists identified: 
1. The distinction between real property (asl) and the revenue or 
usufruct (manfa’a) generated by that property;  
2. The notion that real property could be sequestered in perpetuity 
[quoted in Powers (1999): Gibb and Kramers (1965)].  
3.  
2.2. Early History of and Motives for the Waqf 
 
Although the Qur’an does not mention or specify any institution called waqf, 
many verses are interpreted as instructing Muslims to establish such 
foundations to serve as charitable organizations for the Islamic community. 
The waqf helped the Islamic State to provide public services and goods that 
used to be mainly financed by the zakat, later followed by taxes collected 
from believers, and the expropriations from non-Muslims. The judiciary 
form of the waqf was established around year 755, during the 2nd and 3rd 
Islamic centuries, according to the sources quoted in Kuran (2001). This 
implies the early Islamic state was capable of providing public goods 
because the community was not so large in population and complex in terms 
of organization. It is assumed a central organization would function more 
efficiently in such a society. This brings to light the “worldly” motives for 
the foundation of the waqf institution. First to be considered is the 
transformation in the structure of wealth held by the Islamic community. In 
the 7th century Arab world, most assets were composed of movables at the 
hands of merchants and herdsmen. However, during the period of Umayyad 
and Abbasid dynasties (661-750 and 750-1258, respectively) most wealth 
consisted of immovable assets, such as agricultural land and real estates. One 
of the most significant aspects of a waqf is the endowment to be immovable. 
The Zakat system and the after constituted waqf system would have different 
impacts on different social classes. In the early years of Islam, most of the 
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wealth was in currency form and thus it was exempt from taxation. As the 
Islamic society developed in size and complexity, the waqf system allowed 
the founders greater security of their property and reduced taxation. 
Individuals would enhance the protection of their wealth, and the waqf 
would guarantee the provision of the public good/service (if the property 
appropriated was for public serve).  
There seems to be a contradiction between two functions of the waqfs 
since provision of public goods could be considered as a limitation on 
personal wealth. However, legitimacy of the waqf institution is based mostly 
on the public goods it provides. This is considered an implicit contract 
(Kuran, 2001) between the founders of these institutions and the ruling 
government. The function and mission of waqfs were accomplished under 
the rule of Prophet. While rulers of the Islamic State encouraged foundation 
of waqfs, which meant a serious reduction in the tax revenues, they knew 
these organizations to provide public goods in a decentralized manner 
because of this implicit contract. This condition also legitimized the 
government. This motive was observed mostly in the ruling class which also 
held most of the wealth. They found waqf as a means of protecting their 
personal wealth, as well as a means for maintaining legitimacy because the 
waqf institution was an efficient tool for both providing public goods and 
developing religious organizations for which the society was sensitive. There 
are many instances in the history of Islamic societies that implies the waqf is 
to be attributed as a great importance. In many cases until the attempts 
towards centralization of waqf system began, these institutions were 
protected in a strict sense so that even judiciary power could not make any 
changes on or decide to confiscations. Waqf system developed in pre-
modern Islamic mid-east, including Iran, and in southeast, India to a high 
level which made estimations on the land they possessed to be almost one-
third of the total in most of the Islamic states. As previously stated, waqf 
system is based on land and other immovable properties as well as movable 
properties. By means of the waqf system, personal wealth was transformed 
into social institutions functional within an Islamic society (Yediyıldız, 
1996). Mosques as religious, political, and cultural centers in Islamic cities 
were mostly founded and financed in their operations by waqfs. Within 
decades, mosques were expanded to schools, hospitals and other social 
institutions. These institutions facilitated the social interaction and avoided 
possible stratification, especially in small towns. Some of the remaining 
buildings or complexes from waqf systems are still functioning around the 
Islamic world today.                
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3. Waqf System in Turkey: From Provision of Public Goods to 
Economic Decline 
 
Religious and secular motives for founding a waqf are described in the 
previous section. The discussion in the second section will first focus on the 
economic significance and social role of the waqf system under a state-
controlled economic environment. Factual and possible reasons which led 
once well-functioning and decentralized waqf system to become 
mismanaged, inefficient (even corrupt) and then centralized, are discussed in 
this section. Theories of property rights and principle-agent problems have a 
lot to do with the waqf system regarding the organizational structure of a 
waqf and potential welfare costs. Provision of public goods is another 
ground that unarguably makes the waqf system a question of regulatory 
economics.     
 
3.1. Economic Significance and Social Function 
 
Waqf appears to be the most dominant economic actor outside the 
government in the Islamic States. After the early periods of Islam, significant 
shift in economic activities from mercantilist trade toward agricultural land-
based static systems increased the importance of waqfs. Non-arguably, 
waqfs had their most significant economic implication in the Ottoman world. 
In the early 18th century for instance, the total waqf land were nearly one-
third of the productive land in the Ottoman State. Waqfs used to possess 
many different immovable assets, such as shops, residences, production 
facilities, and other social/public facilities. Since most of the waqfs founded 
by the ruling elite in the case of Ottomans, they possessed a large amount of 
property and wealth, they easily provided public goods under governmental 
supervision. The economic significance of waqfs had two dimensions: 1) 
provision of public goods and 2) protection of property rights. While some 
waqfs directed or supported provision of public goods, others provided 
private goods that are excludible and rival. Tax relief could be given as an 
example to the latter. There are many different examples of non-rival 
consumption goods provided by waqfs, such as delivering water to a local 
area, paying a neighborhood’s taxes, defending a town, supporting retired 
sailors, and operating commuter ships, among others [examples are drawn 
from Kozak, 1985, quoted in Kuran (2001). Many of them could be found in 
also Barkan & Ayverdi (1970), Yediyıldız (1982;1984) and Kazıcı (2003)]. 
Waqf system is observed to be the primary “vehicle for financing Islam as a 
society” (Hodgson, 1974), quoted Kuran (2001). An important social service 
provided by the waqfs was the foundation of schools. In the Ottoman period, 
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after conquering Constantinople (Istanbul) until the 19th century, the number 
of the madrasahs (schools for higher education) built by the waqfs totaled 
more than 500 (Kütükoğlu, 1977), Kazıcı (2003) quoted. Along with the 
services they provided, these schools usually financed their own expenses. 
During the Ottoman period, even a lighthouse on the Romanian coast was 
established under the waqf system and was treated as a pure public good to 
be provided by the government from tax revenues. The waqf system 
constituted a third fiscal category beside the state treasury and “timar 
system”, which was based on taxation of revenues (mostly agricultural) from 
land.  
The waqfs were under protection of religious law, therefore courts 
mostly decided in favor of the founders whose will was respected according 
to the endowment deeds. The right of founding a waqf was granted only to 
Muslims in an Islamic State. However, there were minor exceptions to this 
general rule for the Islamic State. This exception sometimes granted the right 
of establishing a waqf by influential Jewish and Christian individuals. In the 
19th century, this rule was eroded with the permission to individuals of other 
faiths for establishing a waqf. During the period Christians and Jews were 
granted the right to establish a waqf, they gained significant economic 
ground against Muslims in the Ottoman State. It would appear that the 
“worldly waqfs” transferred income from politically and militarily dominant 
Muslims to non-Muslims (Kuran, 2001), since the non- Muslims were also 
exempt from taxations that Muslim individuals were subject to. The implicit 
contract between the government and founders in the process of founding 
waqfs are already discussed. Another issue which arose is the truthfulness 
and credibility of a waqf. Because there is a great amount of resource 
allocation by the waqf system, the credibility and monitoring problems are 
important to consider. A waqf obviously acquires validity and credibility in 
its operations by religious piety. The monitoring issue was in fact easy for 
the charitable waqfs, rather than family waqfs. Since most of the operations 
undertaken by the former ones were public, any disputes over the function of 
the waqfs, or the allocation of revenues, would quickly be a subject of court 
decision. The family waqfs were hardly monitored and any disputes over 
them would be more controversial, compared to the charitable waqfs while 
in some cases the beneficiaries had the cause to sue the mutawalli over their 
actions. The endowment deed, which is basic of a waqf, could be either 
destroyed or damaged so that the courts hardly took action against the status 
quo. These problems caused most of the family waqfs to be confiscated by 
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the government, more intensely after the establishment of the new republic 
(in Turkey).  
With the wealth sheltering function of the waqf, a person could avoid 
heavier taxation (beyond the limits of zakat system) on his/her revenues and 
property (based on the Ottoman land system). It is often claimed that this 
motive was fueled by the fact that the “Islamic world never developed 
effective safeguards against opportunistic taxation or expropriation” (Kuran, 
2001). This argument is only plausible to a limited extent since Islamic law 
had a solid ground for protection of individual rights. At times however, 
given the authoritarian governments in power, the rulers could expropriate 
the private property for the sake of the ummah (term used mostly for a 
Muslim community whatever its level of development, a conception from 
Qur’anic verses) and/or State. The mutawalli, being responsible for the 
management of the waqf, received 10% to 15% or more from the revenues 
generated where regional norms allowed. Usually by subjective 
interpretation of the endowment deed, they defined the social obligations of 
the waqf conservatively. The mutawalli had extensive authority on the use of 
revenue under the constraints of endowment deed.  
Individuals founding family waqfs had limited social obligations and thus, 
limited economic functions. Hence, while waqfs were eroding the tax base 
for the government, the least desirable cases were to be family waqfs 
because they did not provide many social goods or involve economic 
activity. According to one view, weak property rights (of individuals against 
State) and restricted testamentary rights according to Islamic law (Kuran, 
2001) are the basic economic motives of founding a waqf. Following the 
same presumption, one could argue that the State was restricted and 
committed to uphold private property rights under the sacredness and 
protection of the waqf institution. This argument is, however, confronted by 
the fact that government regulation has been excessive on the waqf 
institution during times of institutional decline in Islamic societies. 
Therefore, aside from the positive arguments around the need for regulating 
the waqf system to eliminate issues (such as agency problem or monitoring), 
the above normative arguments on the governance-related motives for waqf 
institutions become obsolete by historical facts of Islamic societies. An even 
more important point is that Islamic law was not that static to prohibit the 
evolution of waqfs and it was indeed very much flexible to allow the waqf 
institution to evolve over time. As Çizakça (2000) puts forward the ten 
conditions of Hanafi jurists regarding the waqf endowments, it is quite 
obvious that foundation and management of waqfs are dynamic processes 
that could adapt into different environments in time. 
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As stated above, the major advantage of the waqf system is the 
polycentric structure of providing social services, including public goods. A 
decentralized system made communication and co-operation among different 
entities easier and thus worked efficiently. One issue regarding the locality 
of waqfs is harmonization and well-functioning. Local institutions made 
information costs lower, given the “local knowledge” of communities, 
families, individuals, and customs implied waqfs to be local agents of 
government. There was uniformity in the system which led to the co-
operation between waqfs and government. However, this introduces the 
issue of flexibility of the waqfs regarding 1) their foundational aspects, and 
2) operational aspects. 
 
3.2. The Structure of Waqf System and Factors Leading to Economic 
Inefficiency 
 
Although the waqf gives a broad freedom to the founder, it is limited in 
terms of operations and management. The mutawalli is first restricted by the 
endowment deed, which is represented by static perpetuity, and second, the 
managerial flexibility is limited because their actions are under the court’s 
monitoring. Perhaps because of this potential inefficiency, the founders of 
the waqf system made the residuary mission of every waqf to the benefit of 
the poor. This mission is once argued to lead the formation of a large class of 
indolent beneficiaries which was a factor behind Islamic world’s long 
economic descent (Quoted in Kuran (2001): Akdağ, 1979; Cem, 1970). As a 
counter argument, however, waqfs are usually seen as complementary to the 
public services where in many cases, they have increased operational 
efficiency. Although a waqf is to be perpetual, in some cases the mutawalli 
could use waqf’s revenue stream for a temporary mission, such as helping 
the victims of natural disasters. A mutawalli was however limited with only 
one set of changes on the operational functioning of the waqf while in some 
cases the endowment and waqf’s mission were also subject to changes. The 
judiciary power was also effective on the managerial decisions of the 
charitable waqfs such that even there were special judges (kadi) and courts 
for waqfs in Istanbul, Bursa and Edirne (three capitals of the Ottoman State 
(Öztürk, 1995). 
A similar argument against the waqfs is made on their sources of 
inefficiency. Accordingly, the root cause of operational rigidity can easily be 
identified as the supremacy given to the founder’s rights to set the terms of 
management in the traditional waqf system. This situation makes the 
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mutawalli only an executor of his or her decisions, suggested by Kuran 
(2001). The mutawalli is argued to be only allowed to make interpretations 
of the understated or ambiguous parts in the endowment deed. Thus, 
following the same logic, waqfs are considered to remain perpetual despite 
having a static structure which made them operate inefficiently and incur 
substantial losses for centuries. Given that assumption to hold true however, 
it leads to the question of how such static institutions managed to last for 
centuries. The answer is not clear, of course. It is also observed that 
constraints on the mutawalli have been gradually removed by re-
interpretation of court decisions among different provinces of the Ottoman 
State.  
In the case of charitable waqfs, the extent of operational rigidity arises 
because of potential agency problems. In cases where the mutawalli is not 
allowed to make modifications or changes in the mission of the waqf to 
ensure the honesty and reputation of the institutions are protected. The rights 
of beneficiaries stated with the endowment deed were also guaranteed. The 
founders usually try to prevent potential abuses in the use of property 
appropriated for a selected mission that the mutawalli is forced to operate 
under tight rules according to Kuran (2001). However, the case of ‘ten 
conditions’ on endowment deeds and mutawalli’s operations again provides 
a solid ground to assume more flexibility than suggested by Kuran and 
others (see Çizakça, 2000 and Çizakça, 2010). Despite the pros and cons 
regarding the waqf system, one should still consider that the classical waqf 
structure was shaped by the socio-economic and religious perceptions in the 
middle ages, so the organizational and operational structure might not have 
allowed them to make fast adjustments despite the fact that they witnessed 
long-term changes.  
 
3.3. Waqf Management in Practice and Rise of Corruption 
 
The discussion on operational flexibility of the waqfs is based on these 
institutions’ compatibility with the economic changes and development. It is 
observed that founders did occasionally give broad powers to their 
mutawallis. Their eyes on the overall value to be maximized, the founders 
would leave the waqf only under judicial review, if necessary. The usual 
inflexible operational aspects of the waqf system could also be said to lead 
the officials sometimes shirking their responsibilities. The mutawalli, 
employees, and judges have tried to make pragmatic adaptations under the 
founder’s directives. Founder’s control over the waqf’s management, 
however, usually seemed to erode, especially beyond his or her lifetime. 
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This would often occur when the waqf deed suffered damage or disappear 
with the passage of time (Kuran, 2001). In such cases, the courts mostly 
modified the operational functions of the waqf in favor of the beneficiaries 
or the wider community. The judicial or governmental intervention could be 
viewed as a form of regulation on the operational flexibility of waqfs. 
Although there is evidence that mutawallis exploited the ambiguities in the 
endowment deed in terms of operating the waqf, it does not prove the 
institution operated under optimal flexibility (Kuran, 2001). Inefficiency was 
either a result of shirking at managerial and operational level, or in some 
cases constraints from the founder’s directives. Charitable waqfs were also 
subject to complaints about their social duties and they would face with 
undesirable court decisions. Individuals with little stake in the foundation of 
a waqf often considered their private benefits only or social services and 
goods produced by the waqf, regardless of their economic implications for 
the institution itself. They constituted another constraint on the operations of 
the waqfs. In family waqfs for instance, the beneficiaries would file 
complaints in order to find evidence of wrongdoings in operations and 
management. This condition of uncertainty led the mutawallis and 
employees to exercise caution in introducing change. Disputes over the 
operational flexibility could result in court decisions either to be welcomed 
by the mutawalli giving the opportunity of transformation without the 
founder’s blessings, or blocking necessary changes even if they are in favor 
of the founder.  
There are confliction views over the causes of managerial and 
operational inefficiencies in the waqf system. Following the neo-classical 
and new institutionalist approach, one could easily regard the waqf system as 
the “bad” that led the economic realm of Islamic societies to collapse over 
time. In Coasian terms for instance, the waqf system is argued to bear a lack 
of well-defined property rights in practical terms. Since the judicial 
interference to the operational flexibility and inconsistencies among the 
decisions discouraged the managers, transactions cost, the possibility of 
shirking and post-contractual opportunism increased. As previously stated, 
there is an implicit contract between the State and waqfs in general. Another 
dimension is the implicit contract between the mutawalli and the founder 
enforced by the endowment deed and judicial system. The transactions cost, 
on the other hand, was too high in most cases because of the uncertainty of 
the result of taking an action by the mutawalli. The transfers of rights on the 
property, or even renting, were always under constraint of the waqf deed. 
Many court decisions do not show the transactions cost of actions taken by 
the mutawalli in order to change the operational aspects or re-interpret the 
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missionary statements in the deed. Because of anticipated transactions costs, 
it can be argued that a large number of socially desirable or efficient waqf 
transactions and adaptations must have remained unimplemented (Kuran, 
2001). The lack of well-defined property rights in the waqf system 
operations and high transactions costs are regarded as the root causes of 
inefficient management and tendencies toward corruption in each level; 
mutawalli, employee and the beneficiary, especially during the times of war 
and other social and governmental difficulties. Managerial inefficiency made 
the resources to be allocated either excessive or insufficient. The provision 
of private goods was preferred over public goods because of the misaligning 
incentives. Although the religious sentiment would have alleviated the 
temptation to shirk, it could not have kept waqfs permanently efficient 
(Kuran, 2001). This statement could be supported with adequate evidence of 
poor management in the practice of waqf system. Despite the positive 
arguments on the reasons for the decline of waqf system due to the 
operational issues regarding individual waqfs, it is not quite evident that 
such charity organizations systematically suffered from bad governance 
practices and in turn led to persistently insufficient institutional structures in 
Islamic societies.   
                   
4. Response to Economic Decline: Evolution in the Waqf System 
 
In sum of the institutional and practical approach towards the waqf system, 
the terms “stronger the state; weaker the waqf system” would be the best 
motto to describe what happened within the last two centuries of the 
Ottoman and Turkish states’ history. At the dawn of the 19th century, the 
waqf system was suffering from irregularities and inefficiencies in 
administration, both of which weakened the legitimacy of these institutions. 
Misallocation of resources and the failure of transformation in operational 
aspects led the waqf system to breakdown. The pecuniary motives of the 
founders and mutawallis, which led to big rents from the operations of 
waqfs, were legally questionable. Government provision of public goods was 
another factor causing the waqf system to loosen.  
 
4.1. Centralization and Regulation of the Waqf System 
 
The evidence of thoughts on centralization of the waqf system goes back to 
1630 when an Ottoman advisor to the Sultan, Koçi Bey ([1630], 1994) urged 
the Ottoman State to take the control of waqfs established on its territories 
(Kuran, 2001). He argued private individuals acquired state lands under the 
institutional protection of built-up awqaf. Contrarily, a 16th century 
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intellectual and statesman, Aşık Paşazade, directed serious criticism against 
the attempts of abolishing several waqfs (Çizakça, 2000). As time passed, 
sultans managed to assert control over vast waqf properties that had turned 
them into low-taxed, if not tax-exempt, private property (Kuran, 2001). For 
years, however, resulting confiscations by the State left the traditional waqf 
system intact. While having respect for and being tied to the founder’s will 
on the individual waqf itself, Ottomans brought some innovative measures to 
the waqf system, such as centralization under a higher authority. The first 
effective step towards centralization of the waqf system was the 
establishment of the State Ministry of Waqfs (Nazareth of Awqaf ı 
Hümayun) in 1826. After the “beneficent administrative reforms” (Tanzimat-
ı hayriyye) in 1839, the rulers’ rapprochement to waqfs was relatively 
challenging to the structure of the traditional system. Although first observed 
in the larger cities and the capital city, there was a fast movement towards a 
gradual centralization in most of the Ottoman provinces. An example is the 
effective regulation of charitable waqfs in Egypt. All lands belonging to 
existing waqfs were formally nationalized in 1812, given that Egypt was 
autonomous in effect. Following the Ottoman Land Law in 1858, Christians 
and Jews were encouraged to found waqfs which would effectively a part of 
the central governance of the waqf system (Shaham, 1991). The decade of 
the 1860’s were observed as the period of big projects undertaken across the 
Ottoman territory which required vast financial resources to be steadily 
available. The revenues from different charitable waqfs started to be pooled 
in a common treasury. Waqf sector also played an important role in 
employment. During the 2nd Constitutional Period in the late Ottoman era, 
8,23%; in the early Republic years 12,68% and in 1990’s 0,76% of the total 
work force was employed in the waqf sector (Öztürk, 1995).  
Nevertheless, the centralization process was followed by a 
decentralization move until the nineteenth century, while the ever-lasting 
effects of the centralization acts and codes were observed in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries (Çizakça, 2000). The centralization (and to some 
extent nationalization) of the waqf system can be read as a significant step 
towards Westernization of the society. The great powers of the time, namely 
England, France, and Germany, were all demanding the abolishment of the 
waqf-system following the Crimean War (Çizakça, 2000). The pro-
Westerners tended to view all traditional institutions as responsible for 
economic and political descent. European policy makers also contributed to 
such a transformation in the waqf system since centralization would allow 
the governments to hold much more control over their societies. The 
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Europeans thought stronger states would find it easier to pursue 
Westernization (Kuran, 2001). The corruptive tendencies among the system 
exaggerated the worsening situation despite some diligent and sincere 
attempts to get the waqfs recovered.  
The transition in the waqf system did not happen easily since in most of 
the modern Middle Eastern or Islamic states, governments made many 
confiscations/expropriations of vast waqf property which were religiously 
considered as sacred. On the other hand, the centralization processes in the 
Muslim world has increased the monitoring and management costs since the 
foundation of Nezaret in the late 19th century of the Ottoman Empire. The 
waqfs had to finance their own operations and additionally, the expenses of 
the state bureaucrats that are presumably responsible for monitoring the 
waqfs’ operations. This occurred while the bureaucracy’s misuse of the 
monitoring power led several cases of indirect confiscation of waqf revenue 
or property through faulty annual reports that were subject to tax-exemptions 
(see Çizakça, 2000). 
The modern waqf system (in most countries under the secular law) 
continues to keeps its fundamental foundations, such as sacredness of the 
founders’ will and the type of the property. Modern waqf is a corporation, an 
internally autonomous organization that the courts treat as a legal person. 
Mostly a board of mutawalli manages the modern waqfs, instead of an 
individual. The legal infrastructure is modified to give wider operational 
powers to the mutawalli boards (Kuran, 2001). This does not mean the 
mutawallis are unconstrained by the founder’s directives, however. Waqfs 
can participate in businesses within the limits of the endowment deed and 
their operations are under legal monitoring. They are allowed to operate with 
pooled resources which assumingly would create economies of scale. Their 
founders may include the government, other non-governmental institutions, 
or firms. Their assets can be in many forms, including cash and stocks 
(Kuran, 2001). Mutawallis enjoy greater flexibility in waqf operations, 
management, disbursement, and investment decisions. Waqfs are still useful 
instruments for providing or, in many areas, complementing social services 
such as financing mosques, schools, hospitals, libraries, and monuments, but 
they are not seen as the primary suppliers of public goods. In most of the 
Middle Eastern and other Islamic countries, governments have become the 
primary providers of public goods. The much more effective enforcement of 
property rights today, as compared to the past, is argued to reduce the waqf 
system’s importance as the most plausible vehicle for wealth sheltering. As a 
general conclusion on the current position of the waqfs, the secularization 
process during late Ottoman and early Turkish republic periods led the waqf 
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system to lose its religious motives as well. They were regarded mostly as 
inefficient economic structures with vast resources. Therefore, during 1920-
1949 and 1960-1970, large confiscations and sales of the waqf property were 
observed in Turkey. 
The waqf system has been neglected and almost became extinct since 
the early days of the modern Turkish state until the 1967 act that 
reconstituted the legal conditions of awqaf in the Turkish law. It is recorded 
that merely 73 new waqfs were established between 1923 and 1967 while 
this number is calculated to be more than 4000 since 1967, quoted Çizakça 
(2000). Since then, the waqf system has been revitalized, though still under 
state monitoring and control. The number, size (in terms of revenue), and 
scope of awqaf flourished dramatically through the 1980s and 1990s, despite 
several attempts to limit the waqf system’s potential. Today, Turkey enjoys 
the existence of waqf institutions either founded by secular or religious 
motives. As of 1987, there were approximately 37,917 properties of awqaf in 
Turkey (Çizakça, 2000). Moreover, the waqf system in Turkey has always 
played a significant role of providing employment opportunities as it 
counted for 8.23%, 12.68% and 0.76% of the total employment figures by 
1900, 1931 and 1990, respectively (Çizakça, 2000). 
 
4.2. An Institutional Approach to the Waqf System 
 
Besides functional market institutions, the very demand for a non-market 
institution in the Islamic history is also a strong motive for the creation of 
such philanthropic institutions throughout history (Çizakça, 2000). As stated 
in above sections, there are many similarities to the philanthropic 
institutions, trusts, in the West, despite the arguments that the Western 
institutions turned out to be more flexible compared to the waqfs (Çizakça, 
2000). According to one definition, awqaf are described as “redistributive 
institutions and poor relief agents” while not being special ventures for profit 
maximization or for establishing large corporations (Orbay, 2006), quoted 
Esmaeili (2010). Convincingly, waqfs are argued to solve the issue of under 
provision of public goods as they mainly offer such services that are often 
considered as public, of course, resultantly, non-rival and non-excludable 
(Çizakça, 2000). 
Institutional perspective on the evolution of awqaf and its current 
administration throughout the Islamic world is often assessed on the grounds 
of property rights. This is due to the excessive number of public goods 
providing awqaf in the history of Islam. Therefore a vast neoclassical 
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literature on the agency problem and its extensions such as shirking, 
misalignment of interests, monitoring costs are easily applied to an 
institution (waqf) which differs from traditional Western trusts in many 
ways. North (1990) however emphasizes the importance of ideology in 
creating institutional change. He argues the existing institutions, both formal 
and informal, provide an incentive structure within which economic, 
political, and social organizations develop. His argument is partly inherited 
by Acemoglu et al. (2005) as they argue the current institutional base in a 
country will have a profound impact on the next period’s institutional 
construction. However, North (1990) adds the ideological perspectives as a 
factor that affects the pace and direction of institutional change while further 
arguing some of the European countries lagged behind due to such 
ideological differences. He also cites the informal institutions, the role of 
property rights, and the role of organizations as important elements of 
institutional change. 
The issue of secure property rights, for instance, is said to arise due to 
the fatwas of the Islamic courts, involvement of Islamic inheritance law, and 
the potential agency problems, according to Shatzmiller (2001). Different 
juristic approaches to the issue of transferring property rights in the main 
schools of Islamic thought is considered as another obstacle on ensuring 
property rights over the endowments, Shatzmiller (2001) argues. More 
emphasized are the cases where the property rights (i.e. for the lands subject 
to endowments) are shared among two or more owners. Providing examples 
of the free rider problem from the 12th and 15th century Fez, Shatzmiller 
(2001) concludes the institutional history of the public good waqf was 
distinct from that of the family waqf. The charity foundations that provided 
public goods or services faced multi-faceted challenges in their operations 
compared to the family endowments, she asserts. The strictly legal and 
economic aspects of the public good waqfs increased the management costs 
considerably while leaving rooms for conflicting interests and potential 
agency problems. In that regard, Shatzmiller (2001)  provides instances of 
fatwas which show institutional behavior resulting in loss of revenue, 
confusion, interruption of work, increased costs, declining revenue, or no 
income at all. Once Islamic societies enjoyed over-supplied public goods and 
services via well-functioning waqfs, centralized government sector was 
nearly non-existent for centuries. Following the economic and political 
decline of the Islamic states however, waqfs –especially the ones providing 
public goods- suffered hugely. 
However, the waqf system should be assessed under a multi-dimensional 
approach, including the Islamic culture, law, and other secular means (i.e. 
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economy), in order to reach a comprehensive institutional understanding. 
Islamic elements mostly represented by the divine law and cultural 
inheritance are often cited as the inhibitive factors that led the Middle 
Eastern and Islamic countries to economic stagnation for centuries. 
According to Kuran (2004), for instance, Islamic contract law and heritance 
law are among the leading factors along with the waqf system that caused 
underdeveloped economies throughout the Islamic world. The issue of 
private property is also analyzed by Messick (2003: 723) with special 
reference to the case of Yemen, as he considers the judicial problems which 
arose after the application of Islamic inheritance law and cites the resulting 
issues from the exercise of preemption rights following the sale of an 
inherited land share by one of the shareholders to a third party. On the other 
hand, Kuran (2007) argued the perpetuity principle in the foundation of waqf 
led to the properties owned by the waqf becoming unproductive and 
inflexible. However, in Coasian terms, the initial delimitation of legal rights 
established by the legal system has importance on lowering contractual and 
transaction costs, while the type of contracts made is important because 
long-term contracts have lower costs. Coase (1960) made his point on the 
property rights argument on the basis of the efficient allocation problem and 
the inefficiency arising with government regulation in any industry. 
Likewise, one might argue, contrarily to the arguments against the own-
decay of the waqf system, the state intervention into in the late Ottoman 
period made the case even worse and more costly to manage. Therefore, the 
only inflexibility under the perpetuity principle is the non-transferability of 
rights which in some cases were re-defined over changing circumstances. 
According to Kuran (2011), what made the Middle East fall behind the 
West in terms of economic performance is not the conservatism or hostility 
towards commerce; rather, it was the lack of proper institutional base that 
was mostly represented by traditional ones that failed to generate incentives 
for organizational innovation in the private economy (Kuran, 2011: 10-11). 
The arguments by North (1990) or Acemoglu et al. (2005) suggesting the 
Western traditional institutions by-force or organically evolved into new 
ones through the rapid changes in social and economic structures might be 
read as supportive to the ideas brought forward by Kuran (2011). It is, 
however, more interesting to observe that many Middle Eastern nations 
faced with economic decline throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. They are 
very likely to have witnessed the abolishment of traditional Islamic 
institutions and insertion of the modern Western ones. Kuran (2011) brings 
his arguments forward as he asserts the differences between inheritance 
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practices in the two regions (Mideast and West) had enormous implications 
for institutional development through time, while also arguing the waqf 
institutions led to the blockage for the development of self-governing 
organizations outside the state which is essential to a strong civil society 
(Kuran, 2011: 11). 
Following Kuran (2001), Esmaeili (2010) underlines the differences 
between the legal nature of the waqf institution and land ownership system 
in the Islamic law and the trust institution and real property law in Western 
countries. He argues that such differences are relevant in understanding the 
Muslim nations’ failure to establish a rule of law system. On the contrary, 
Çizakça (2007) argues the traditional institutions stemming from Al-
Ghazali’s (economic) principle of maqasid al-shari’ah (i.e. awqaf), which 
have been inspiring to the Western states, are compatible with the current 
successful modern economies’ institutional and governance structures in 
their basics (Çizakça, 2007).  
Schoenblum (1999) also argues the waqf, as compared to the trust in 
Western tradition, could not cope with the changing environment, while the 
trust law has effectively and formally responded to meet changed 
circumstances (Schoenblum, 1999). In contrast to the waqf, the trust, from 
the time of its origins as a use, has been the epitome of a vaguely defined 
legal construct able to address practical wealth management and disposition 
requirements of property owners, according to Schoenblum (1999). With 
that regard, it is worth noting that an argument against the negative 
perception of the legal nature of family waqfs, the far less common practiced 
form of awqaf in the history of Islam [Quoted in Çizakça (2000): According 
to the figures provided by Barkan, the family/charity waqf ratio in the 18th 
century was 14.20% and 16.87% in the 19th century, in terms of total 
revenue ], are mostly founded to protect the family’s wealth and prosperity 
from arbitrary confiscations of the rulers, according to Köprülü (1942) and 
Gerber (1988: 35), quoted by Çizakça (2000: 24). 
Kuran (2004 and 2007) seems to have fallen to the same mistake of 
using the governance indicators and institutional basis in a country 
interchangeably. Although there is no clear distinction between the two in a 
vast body of literature, it is quite evident that the governance indicators, as 
well as policy choices, are the result of long-run evolving institutions. 
Hence, Islamic law, or shari’ah, has not prohibited nor inhibited economic 
activity while its poor practice in many areas, including the waqf system, led 
to economic inefficiency and poor redistribution of wealth among the 
societies. When the Ottomans are particularly considered, the unfavorable 
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economic policies pursued by the government, and thus an insecure 
environment for capital accumulation for centuries led to small firm sizes. 
On the other hand, geographical disparities, controls over prices (narh) and 
profits, high interest rates due to deteriorating economy, property rights 
restrictions and wide-spread confiscations created instable economic agents 
(Çizakça, 2010). It is convincing that the unfavorable conditions for the 
well-defined and secure property rights to flourish in the Ottoman Empire 
left the once well-functioning waqf system intact and caused its decline. The 
relative flexibility in court decisions, on the other hand, was misused and 
often caused moral hazard issues. Therefore, it is neither the rigidity of 
shari’ah nor the Islamic inheritance or contract laws that led to economic 
decline in the Islamic countries, as implied by Kuran (2011), which are 
mostly characterized by the waqf system. It seems that excessive 
governmental intervention and the principle-agent problems that impeded 
the establishment of well-defined property rights in the Islamic world are to 
blame for the current underdevelopment. 
Lastly, Mohammad and Mar Iman (2006) propose an alternative 
thinking of the perpetuity principle of a waqf through their distinction 
between the perpetuity of a physical object and its ‘dedication’ of benefits. 
Their contribution is the attachment of a value to the physical property 
(immovable) and its non-transferability as they offer any valid valuable thing 
as the medium of waqf such as cash, equities, goods and services which be 
treated same as land and other immovable properties (Mohammad and Mar 
Iman, 2006). No matter what measures are taken to revive the waqf system 
in the modern economies of the Islamic world, it is crystal clear that such 
charitable endowments should be complementary to the governments’ 
economic functions. Thus, we may sum up with the following argument 
from the Turkish case that both the country’s overall economic and political 
environment, as well as the condition of its waqf sector could improve 
though the private entities’ entrepreneurship is expected to further develop. 
This is followed by the increasing number of endowments to reinstate social 
justice and other means complementary to economic success. 
In this regard, we will conclude this section with a short emphasis on 
Turkey’s experience with the rise and decline of awqaf in parallel to the 
changes in its institutional structure, which is measured through several 
distinct governance indicators. In order to understand the relative dynamics 
of the waqfs’ development to that of Turkey’s overall governance 
performance, relevant descriptive statistics of the last three decades are 
presented in the appendix. The figure and tables all indicate a parallel 
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improvement in both Turkey’s economic and governance performance and 
the waqf system in terms of the newly established endowments over the 
period of 1980-2010. Therefore, our previous argument on the social and 
economic role of waqf institution that is described as being complementary, 
rather than substitute, to government institutions seems to be justified with 
the data from Turkey’s recent experience. The arguments that relate poor 
management issues on the micro-scale with macro-perspective 
generalizations about the institutional base in the Islamic world fail to 
describe the real motives of founding awqaf and reasons of their historical 
rises and declines. Lastly, our data from Turkey and the discussions around 
waqfs’ historical trajectory suggest charitable organizations or Islamic 
waqfs, in specific, do not emerge due to the lack of well-defined property 
rights and the rule of law in a society while they flourish under such an 
environment that leans on sound institutional basis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This brief overview and analysis of the waqf system in the Islamic world, 
emphasizing Turkish societal tradition, implies that even in undemocratic 
and non-western social organizations, definition and protection of property 
rights could be regarded as fundamental issues in formation of a social 
organism. Waqfs have been seen both philanthropic and economic 
institutions which made them an important socio-economic actor for 
centuries. The most important aspect of this system is the provision of public 
and private goods. Although it can hardly claim that these institutions 
represent a modern type of institution with fully defined property rights 
supported by law, they provided some basis of protection of wealth and a 
pragmatic solution to the structural and financial problems regarding the 
public goods/ services. The Islamic community has preserved a long-lasting 
tradition of these institutions that still have impacts on shaping the societies. 
Special attention to the structure of the system in the Ottoman State was 
given because of the extent that waqf institution reached its peak level in 
both organizational and operational dimensions. Today, the waqf system can 
be modified and supported as an important economic partner to the business 
sector in both operational and financial senses. On the other hand, charitable 
waqfs can be regenerated in most of the local areas to provide public goods 
which turn out to be in service forms today.  
The inefficiencies stemming from the foundational aspects and 
operational rigidities can be reassessed and reduced with appropriate 
adjustments. Regarding the Turkish case, the heavily government regulation 
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should be removed and waqfs should be given more legal and bureaucratic 
freedom. Counting the Waqfs Bank of Turkey first, many waqf foundations 
and property are still managed and/or controlled by the State. The 
government is suggested to remain outside of the system, allowing the waqfs 
to operate in a decentralized way. Given a more sound legal basis and better 
defined property rights in Turkey, the waqf system can operate more 
efficiently. Supported by the arguments put forward by Çizakça (2000), the 
rebirth of the waqf system is essential, given more room for operation under 
flexible laws and governance structures, beginning with the abandonment of 
the modern hostility towards such institutions and paving the way for a 
comprehensive reform (Çizakça, 2000). Last but not the least; awqaf could 
function as complementary structures for policy reforms in the economic 
scheme while creating the suitable basis for institutional diversity for 
economic freedom and democratization of the modern Islamic societies. 
Opening more space to the waqf system parallel to other governance 
structures will only enhance social capabilities and increase the role of 
individual contribution to the economic activities through non-governmental 
means. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of Newly Established Waqf in Turkey (1980-2011), Directorate General of Foundations 
 
The following information on the structure and sources of International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) Political Risk Services’ data provides a useful 
overview to the governance indicators used in this study: 
“The aim of the political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the political stability of the countries covered by ICRG on a comparable basis. 
This is done by assigning risk points to a preset group of factors, termed political risk components. The minimum number of points that can be assigned to each 
component is zero, while the maximum number of points depends on the fixed weight that component is given in the overall political risk assessment. In every case 
the lower the risk point total, the higher the risk, and the higher the risk point total the lower the risk. To ensure consistency, both between countries and over 
time, points are assigned by ICRG editors on the basis of a series of pre-set questions for each risk component.”(ICRG, 2011) 
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Component Points (max.) 
Government Stability 12 
Socioeconomic Conditions 12 
Investment Profile 12 
Internal Conflict 12 
External Conflict 12 
Corruption 6 
Military in Politics 6 
Religious Tensions 6 
Law and Order 6 
Ethnic Tensions 6 
Democratic Accountability 6 
Bureaucracy Quality 4 
Total             100 
Indicator 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Bureaucracy Quality 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2,583 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Democratic Accountability 3,833 4 4,25 5 5 4,417 3,75 4,333 6 6 6 4,833 5 3,583 2 3,583 4 3 2 3,75 5,375 5,5 2 2 2 2 2
Ethnic Tensions 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3,417 3,25 2,5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2,042 2,5 5 5 5 5 5
Law and Order 3 3 3 3 3 2,75 2 2,083 4,167 4 4 4,5 4,417 4 4 3,333 3,917 4 4 4,208 4,5 4,5 5 5 5 5 5
Religious Tensions 3 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 5 5 5 5
Military in Politics 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 4,5 3,333 3 2 1 1 2 3 2,917 2,917 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Corruption 3 3 3 3 3 2,083 2 2,417 4 4 4 3,667 2 2 2 2 2,583 2,833 2 2,333 2,5 2,5 2 2 2 2 2
Ext Conflict 8 8 8 8 7,5 8,417 8,25 8,75 10 10,33 10,83 9,5 9,083 9,583 8,25 9,25 9,5 8,542 10,42 8,625 8,625 9,25 11,5 11 11 11 11
Internal Conflict 6,833 7 7,083 7 6,333 6 5,917 6,167 7,667 8,167 7,5 7,25 7,417 7 4,25 4,25 7,667 8,375 9,333 9,417 9,042 9,583 10,5 10,5 10,5 10,5 10,5
Investment Profile 8 6,583 6,167 6 5 4,25 4 4,167 5,917 6 5,083 5 4,75 7,083 8 8 9,75 7,708 7,833 7,5 7,875 8 8 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5
Socioeconomic Conditions 7,417 7 6,75 6 3,75 2,417 2,083 3,917 6,5 5,333 5,917 5,75 4,5 2 2 2,417 2 3,333 4,25 5 6,375 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6 6
Government Stability 8 7,75 7 6,333 5,583 3,667 4,5 5,417 8 6,333 5,083 5,5 6,833 9,083 10,08 9,75 9,667 7,625 7,042 9,5 9,625 10 11 11 11 11 11
 
Table 1. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Indicators, Turkey (1984-2010) 
 
          89 
  Economics of Philanthropic Institutions, Regulation and Governance  
in Turkey    
 
 
The below data in Table 2 shows different governance indicators created by the Fraser Institute and the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Report. The 
first column refers to the government’s share in the total GDP of Turkey in years; the second column is the index constructed by the Global Competitiveness 
Report surveys as well as the ICRG data. The third and fourth columns are constructed by Global Competitiveness Report surveys along with the World Bank’s 
Doing Business data. The fifth and sixth columns refer to Turkey’s ranking in terms of 5 broad categories through years. For the second, third, fourth and fifth 
columns, the higher the index is the better for economic freedom. 
Years 
Size of 
Government 
Legal System 
& Property 
Rights--
Adjusted 
Time with 
government 
bureaucracy 
Regulation--
Adjusted Rank Percentile 
1980 4,4 5,6 - 4,4 99 5% 
1985 4,9 5,8 - 5,2 81 27% 
1990 5,8 4,5 - 5,1 88 22% 
1995 6,9 4,8 6,2 6,1 76 39% 
2000 7,1 5,4 5,2 5,6 96 20% 
2001 6,7 4,1 6,5 4,9 109 11% 
2002 7,0 4,5 5,3 5,2 109 11% 
2003 7,5 5,3 5,3 5,4 95 25% 
2004 8,3 5,2 4,8 5,1 85 33% 
2005 7,8 6,5 6,2 5,6 97 31% 
2006 7,4 6,3 4,3 6,0 91 35% 
2007 7,5 5,7 4,8 6,1 92 35% 
2008 7,4 5,6 5,1 6,0 74 48% 
Table  2. Fraser Institute EFW Data, Turkey (1980-2008) 
